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Abstract 
The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and the University of Maryland Institute for 
Advanced Computer Studies are studying mechanisms for installing and managing 
Storage Area Networks (SANs) that span multiple independent collaborating institutions 
using Storage Area Network Routers (SAN Routers). 
managing inter-site distributed SANs that uses Grid Technologies to balance the 
competing needs to control local resources, share information, delegate administrative 
access, and manage the complex trust relationships between the participating sites. 
We present a framework for 
Introduction 
A Background Introduction to SAN Routing 
SAN Routers that use protocols like iSCSI, FCIP, and iFCP to interconnect 
geographically distributed SANs over high-speed Internet Protocol (IP) networks are 
typically deployed to support business continuity and disaster recovery for applications 
that: 
0 Replicate data between data centers that are connected over wide-area IP 
networks in order to increase data availability or to support efficient Disaster 
Recovery [ 11 
Extend SAN connectivity within the data center or to remote sites within a 
metropolitan area using IP networks as a ubiquitous interconnect for the purpose 
of server clustering, LAN-free remote tape backup, or remote data access. [ 11 
Expedite adoption of networked storage by reducing the cost of the equipment 
and expertise needed to deploy a SAN infrastructure based soley on Fibre- 
Channel connectivity. [ I] 
Deployments like these represent the state-of-the-art for SAN extension technologies in 
production environments. Basic data transfers for these applications proved to be 
scalable and robust on 1 0-Gigabit networks with transcontinental latencies during data 
transfer exhibitions at SC2002 [2] [3]. 
There is also a growing interest in running shared file systems over IP S A N s  between 
geographically distributed sites in order to support high-performance, data-intensive, and 
grid computing. Although these applications are much more experimental than those 
described above, previous work presented at MSST2003 demonstrated the feasibility of 
running the CentraVision File System (CVFS) and the Global File System (GFS) over IP 
SANs that connected the Goddard Space Flight Center, the University of Maryland, and 
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the Gilmore Creek Alaska Ground Station Facility [4]. Related work at the San Diego 
Supercomputer Center and on the Teragrid showed the feasibility of running the Global 
Parallel File System over a 10 and 30 Gigabit-Ethernet IP networks that connected the 
San Diego Supercomputer Center (SDSC), the National Center for Supercomputing 
Applications (NCSA) and the show floors at SC2003 and SC2004. [5], 
both the Teragrid and the Distributed European Infrastructure for Supercomputing 
Applications began to deploy the first production shared global file systems [6]. 
In the past year, 
The Goddard Space Flight Center and the University of Maryland maintain a test bed as a 
continuation of the research presented at MSST03, and in order to support new 
evaluations of shared file systems and IP SAN technologies within the Metropolitan-Area 
Network established by the Mid-Atlantic Crossroads. Figure 1 illustrates our test bed. 
Our test bed is built on McData Eclipse Storage Routers installed at NASA Goddard 
Space Flight Center (GSFC) and the University of Maryland Institute for Advanced 
- Computer Studies (UMIACS). Each site has existing high-end computing, data storage, 
and visualization systems in order to support experimentation on specific inter-site S A N  
applications. GSFC and UMIACS are connected with Gigabit Ethernet links through the 
Mid-Atlantic Crossroads Meta-pop (Max) and high-speed wide-area connectivity 
through Internet2. 
In our test bed, we are particularly interested in developing mechanisms for managing IP 
SANS that span multiple independent administrative organizations, because distributed 
administration has been a particularly difficult aspect of our previous work. Current 
management systems lack mechanisms to establish strong authentication and fine-grained 
trust between participating sites. Instead, most command-line interfaces provide just a 
few levels of authorization, such as read-only, read-write or administrative access. We 
also lack mechanisms to deal with the dynamic nature of inter-site SANS in which we 
assume that networks will change and sites will occasionally reconfigure or expand their 
environment. Finally, we need mechanisms that can reduce the level of inter-site 
coordination and administrative intervention needed to configure and maintain IP SAN. 
This paper presents a prototype management system that allows participating sites to 
delegate administrative authority for specific administrative functions using secure Web 
Services. We discuss the overall design of our management system, its software 
components and security model, and a sample administrative application that will operate 
in the GSFC-UMIACS IP SAN test bed. 
Our approach: Applying grid technologies to inter-site SAN 
management 
The overall approach of our prototype management system is to apply Grid-computing 
technologies to the problem of delegating administration and managing trust between 
participants in an inter-site SAN. Each site runs a management server that supports 
remote procedure calls for two secure web services: an “invocation” service that allows 
authenticated users to invoke trusted administrative scripts at remote sites and a “rights” 
web service that applies fine-grained authorization policies to allow or deny authenticated 
user requests. Several technologies are needed to secure the system: all of its 
communications are encrypted using the Secure Sockets Layer, and both of its web 
services are secured according to the OASIS Web Services Security Specification (WS- 
Security). A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) identifies participating users, sites, and 
services with X.509 certificates. 
In practice, our system allows users to remotely execute shared administrative scripts 
through a command-line interface to the Invocation Web Service in order to manage 
systems at remote sites in an inter-site IP SAN. Their requests are authenticated through 
the Public Key Infrastructure and authorized by the Rights Web Service that maintains 
the database of the site’s trusted users and their permissions. Our system also provides an 
interface that allows each site to independently define what administrative scripts they 
would like to share with specific remote users. Figure 2. Provides an overview of the 
major software components in our management system, their functionalities, and their 
relationships. 
Figure 2. Software Components of the Management System. 
The main goals of our prototype are to demonstrate: 
methods for strong authentication and fine-grained authorization that can support 
distributed storage management, 
a software environment in which local sites can retain control of their own 
resources even while delegating some administrative tasks to remote 
collaborators, 
tools to reduce the level of inter-site coordination and administrative intervention 
required to manage an IP S A N  that operates between collaborating but 
independent organizations. 
Our prototype addresses each of these goals with software components that have been 
implemented in the Grid Computing community. 
Description of Software components 
The Management Server 
The core of our system is the management server, which handles all of the inter-site 
management requests through its secure web services, manages the authorization 
databases, and executes the administrative scripts on behalf of remote users. It is built on 
a Secure Sockets Layer-enabled Apache Tomcat Server [7] with Java 1.5 and the 
Unlimited Strength Cryptography extensions fiom Sun Microsystems. We configure 
Tomcat with a number of software packages and security enhancements to support: 
0 Secure transport based on mutually authenticated connections through the Secure 
Hypertext Transport Protocol (HTTPS) in which both the client and the server 
must present trusted X.509 certificates in order to communicate, 
Apache Axis- an implementation of the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 
recommendation to the W3C that we use as a messaging layer to implement our 
Web Services. [SI 
Apache WSS4J- an implementation of WS-Security that we use to implement 
message level security for our web services. [9] [ 101 
Security constraints within the Tomcat server that limit access to the web services 
to trusted users that have valid entries in our authorization database. 
0 
0 
0 
The software configuration that supports secure web services on the management server 
is very similar to the Producer-Archive Workflow Network’s (PAWN) Receiving Server 
that was presented at MSSTO5. [ 1 11 
The management server also hosts a MySQL relational database management system 
E121 as an authorization database. It contains a table of authorized users, which we 
represent by X.509 Subject Identifiers, and a table of permissions that grant or deny those 
users access to specific administrative scripts. Both Tomcat and the Rights Web Service 
use these databases to authorize user requests. 
The Invocation Web Service 
The invocation web service provides the programmatic interface for our system’s remote 
management capabilities. When a user requests the remote execution of an 
administrative script, the Invocation Web Service processes the request as follows: 
1. it receives the request as a SOAP message over a mutually-authenticated and 
encrypted SSL connection, 
2. it uses WSS4J to ensure that the message is secure. It confirms that the message 
is signed by a valid X.509 certificate and that it has not been tampered with in any 
way. 
3. It calls the Rights Web Service to confirm that the user is trusted and authorized 
to call the requested administrative script. 
4. It checks the requested scripts arguments and inputs for disallowed characters or 
potentially malicious strings. 
5. It executes the requested script and returns the standard output and error to the 
remote user. 
It also provides an interface with which users can browse available scripts and an 
interface that allows each site to manage the repository of scripts that they wish to share. 
The Script Repository 
Our prototype administrative scripts are written in Expect [ 131, because it provides a 
convenient interface for configuring the McData Eclipse Routers using their command 
line interface through the telnet protocol. Expect is an extension of tcl that is frequently 
used by systems administrators to automate complex configuration tasks through terminal 
interfaces [ 141. 
In our environment at the University of Maryland, most administrative scripts are 
implemented in Perl, Expect, or Shell Scripts, and we wanted to ensure that local 
administrators would be able to easily author, check, and update the scripts as needed. 
Our approach also allows us to share third-party binary programs whose functionality we 
might not be able to replicate in a home-grown program. Administrators and vendors 
already have existing tools for troubleshooting and managing filesystems, SANS, and IP 
networks, and we wanted to be sure that they could be use in our environment whenever 
it was possible and practical. 
The careful development of administrative scripts is an important aspect of the system’s 
overall security model. The security model for our administrative scripts is very similar 
to Common Gateway Interface scripts, which can be particularly vulnerable to input 
injection attacks if they are not carefully written and called. Given their administrative 
privileges on the S A N  routers, it is particularly important that all of the shared 
administrative scripts be carefully written and reviewed before they are put into service. 
The Rights Web Service 
The rights web service provides the programmatic interface to determine what remote 
users and sites are authorized to access each administrative script. It allows us to 
associate certificate common names that identify users with the scripts that they are able 
to invoke through the invocation web service. 
The rights web service’s is responsible for the following steps: 
1. It re-checks the validity of the client’s certificate, even though the Tomcat server 
has validated the certificate during mutual authentication. 
2. It checks that the client certificate is not listed in the Certificate Revocation List 
published by our Certificate Authority. 
3. It extracts the Common Name ffom the client’s X.509 certificate and queries the 
database to be sure that it is listed as a trusted user in our authorization database. 
4. It ensures that the trusted user is authorized to invoke the requested administrative 
script by querying the permissions table in out authorization database. 
It should be noted that in a large grid installation, something like the Community 
Authorization Service would be a better choice because it would support greater 
functionality as an authorization system. However, we implemented a more basic 
authorization service because our test-bed is only intended to support just tens of sites 
with a relatively small number of test users. 
The Classads Registry 
We are also developing a central registry of administrative information about the 
part of the Condor project at the University of Wisconsin.[ 151 Classads allow us to 
accurately describe resources in our distributed S A N  as well as policies that should 
govern their use. The ClassAds language is particularly attractive for our administrative 
registry because it allows administrators at the invocation site to control how their site is 
described and the policy requirements for using their resource. 
. distributed S AN based on the Classified Advertisements (classads) library developed as 
Ongoing Deployment in GSFC-UMD Test bed 
A Sample Application 
GSFC and UMIACS have developed and tested the prototype management framework 
and are in the process of deploying management servers in their IF’ S A N  test bed. One of 
the main goals of this effort is to demonstrate the ability of our software to grant authority 
to a user so that he or she can bootstrap access to a remote S A N  device and subsequently 
tear down that connection without any administrative intervention. In this section, we 
describe the configuration of the management system in our test bed, and our approach to 
delegate administrative control of a SAN LUN from the test SAN at UMIACS to a user at 
GSFC. 
Preparing the Local SAN environments at UMD and GSFC 
In order to prepare the existing SAN environments for interaction with the new 
management system, each site’s administrative staff will need to complete the following 
tasks: 
Strictly partition shared SAN devices from private SAN devices through a 
physical reconfiguration or through Zone or LUN-masking policies. Isolating 
shared resources helps each site retain control and ownership of their own 
systems. In this configuration, no SAN-attached device can ever be accessed by 
remote sites unless it is manually configured into the shared zone. 
Storage Routers must be configured for basic connectivity and functionality. 
Each router needs a public Ethernet connection that will cornmunicate with other 
storage routers to move data across the inter-site SAN and a private Ethernet 
connection that needs to be isolated and protected from untrusted networks so that 
we can use it to safely administer the SAN Router using unencrypted protocols 
like Telnet or SNMP. 
Register and configure a unique mSAN identifier for each Storage Router and a 
unique Zone identifier for each shared SAN zone. Otherwise, identifier conflicts 
can occur and iFCP connections will fail. 
The Management Servers needs to be configured. It needs a public interface that 
remote users can access and it needs to be connected to the SAN router’s private 
management network so that it can access the SAN router’s command-line 
interface. It also needs to be configured with the router’s login usei-name and 
password. 
Figure 3. illustrates how the test bed will be prepared for our management system. In 
particular, it shows the division of shared and private SAN zones, as well as how the 
management servers and participating hosts connect to each other over IP networks and 
to the SAN Routers. It also depicts the separation of the private management network at 
each site and the public network connectivity between each site. 
Figure 3. Preparing the GSFC-UMD S A N  Test bed for our Management Software. 
Manually Sharing LUNS between UMD and GSFC 
If we were to manually bootstrap an inter-site S A N  connection between zones at UMD 
and GSFC without our management system in place, we would take the following steps: 
1.  
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
We would determine the IP address and mSAN id of both the GSFC and 
UMIACS SAN routers. 
We would ensure that the S A N  routers have different mSAN ids. 
We would agree on a common zone id to represent our new inter-site S A N  on 
both storage routers. This zone id needs to match for bi-direction connectivity 
within the inter-site SAN, so this needs to be agreed upon before any 
configuration takes place. 
Both sites would independently create a new zone with the common zone id. 
Both sites would connect their storage router's R-PORT with the S A N  fabric 
that they want to share, and associate the R-PORT with the newly created 
zone. 
UMIACS would add the GSFC S A N  Router's IP and mSAN identifier to the 
access control list for the iFCP connections on our storage router, and we 
would specify that we will share our new zone over the connection. 
GSFC would add the UMIACS S A N  Router's IP and mSAN identifier to the 
access control list for the iFCP connections on our storage router, and we 
would specify that we will share our new zone over the connection. 
This is what we have done in the past, and it is easy to see how error prone this process 
can be between multiple sites with so much coordination of administrative information by 
phone and email. We feel that the limitations of these current management systems 
present a serious barrier to developing large-scale inter-site SANs.  
Sharing LUNS between UMD and GSFC using the Management 
System. 
Our management system simplifies the setup process significantly because it provides a 
secure registry for all of the requisite administrative information including IP addresses, 
mSAN identifiers, and Zone identifier for the participating S A N  routers. Administrators 
can browse the available remote resources to support manual configurations of existing 
resources and be assured that they are choosing settings that will not conflict with other 
sites. Scripts can access the administrative information programmatically to support 
automatic configuration of new systems. In fact, new zones and S A N  routers that are 
installed into the framework require even less coordination, because they can register 
unique identifiers when they are first installed. 
The management system in our test bed will also demonstrate dynamic reconfiguration of 
the shared SAN. In the manual configuration described above, sharing LUNs between 
UMIACS and GSFC requires separate administrative intervention on both sides of the 
connection to share and unshared a LUN, and, unfortunately, both administrators end up 
running the same commands over and over again on their respective SAN Routers. 
Scripting these repetitive commands and making them available to trusted users through 
the Invocation Web Service enables users to reconfigure the inter-Site SAN and to access 
remote SAN devices as needed without any administrative intervention. We are excited 
about the possibilities for this type of dynamic inter-site storage area network. 
Summary 
Our pilot system shows some ways in which widely used web and Grid Computing 
technologies can be successfully employed to support the complex security issues and 
trust relationships that arise in inter-site SAN installations. 
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